“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Subhasish Chowdhury and Sang-Hyun Kim

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 486-493

Abstract: We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

Keywords: Contest design; Multiple winner; Group-size; Selection mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:486-493

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

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