"Small, yet Beautiful": Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests

Subhasish Chowdhury and Sang-Hyun Kim

No 2016rwp-98, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner- selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests, and the case in which there is restriction in the number of sub-contests.

Keywords: Contest design; Multiple winner; Group-size; Selection mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13pages
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: “Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests (2017)
Working Paper: "Small, yet beautiful": Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yon:wpaper:2016rwp-98

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