Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets

Sangram V. Kadam and Maciej Kotowski

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 112, issue C, 1-20

Abstract: We analyze a T-period, two-sided, one-to-one matching market without monetary transfers. Under natural restrictions on agents' preferences, which accommodate switching costs, status-quo bias, and other forms of inter-temporal complementarity, dynamically stable matchings exist. We propose a new ordering of the stable set ensuring that it forms a lattice. We investigate the robustness of dynamically stable matchings with respect to the market's time horizon and frequency of rematching opportunities.

Keywords: Two-sided matching; Dynamic matching; Stable matching; Market-design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825618301192
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:112:y:2018:i:c:p:1-20

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.005

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().