Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets

Sangram Kadam and Maciej Kotowski

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: We analyze a T-period, bilateral matching economy without monetary transfers. Under natural restrictions on agents' preferences, which accommodate switching costs, status-quo bias, and other forms of inter-temporal complementarity, dynamically stable matchings exist. We propose an ordering of the set of dynamically stable matchings ensuring this set forms a lattice. We investigate the robustness of dynamically stable matchings with respect to the market's time horizon. We relate our analysis to market-design applications, including student-school assignment and labor markets.

JEL-codes: C71 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/work ... ?PubId=9763&type=WPN

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Journal Article: Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp15-031

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