Communication with evidence in the lab

Jeanne Hagenbach and Eduardo Perez

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 112, issue C, 139-165

Abstract: We study a class of sender–receiver disclosure games in the lab. Our experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure. We use local and global properties of the incentive graph to explain behavior and performance of players across different games. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose, while other types use vague messages. Receivers take the evidence disclosed by senders into account, and perform better in games with an acyclic graph. Senders perform better in games with a cyclic graph. The data is largely consistent with a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking based on the iterated elimination of obviously dominated strategies.

Keywords: Sender–receiver game; Hard evidence; Information disclosure; Masquerade relation; Skepticism; Obvious dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561830143X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Communication with Evidence in the Lab (2018)
Working Paper: Communication with evidence in the lab (2018)
Working Paper: Communication with evidence in the lab (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:112:y:2018:i:c:p:139-165

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.002

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().