Communication with evidence in the lab

Jeanne Hagenbach () and Eduardo Perez
Additional contact information
Jeanne Hagenbach: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research

SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL

Abstract: We study a class of sender–receiver disclosure games in the lab. Our experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure. We use local and global properties of the incentive graph to explain behavior and performance of players across different games. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose, while other types use vague messages. Receivers take the evidence disclosed by senders into account, and perform better in games with an acyclic graph. Senders perform better in games with a cyclic graph. The data is largely consistent with a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking based on the iterated elimination of obviously dominated strategies.

Keywords: Sender–receiver game; Hard evidence; Information disclosure; Skepticism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, 112, pp.139 - 165. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.002⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Communication with evidence in the lab (2018)
Working Paper: Communication with Evidence in the Lab (2018)
Working Paper: Communication with evidence in the lab (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03391914

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().