Communication with Evidence in the Lab

Jeanne Hagenbach and Eduardo Perez

No 12927, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study a class of sender-receiver disclosure games in the lab. Our experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure. We use local and global properties of the incentive graph to explain behavior and performance of players across different games. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose, while other types use vague messages. Receivers take the evidence disclosed by senders into account, and perform better in games with an acyclic graph. Senders perform better in games with a cyclic graph. The data is largely consistent with a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking based on the iterated elimination of obviously dominated strategies.

Keywords: Sender-receiver game; Hard evidence; Information disclosure; Masquerade relation; Skepticism; Obvious dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Communication with evidence in the lab (2018)
Working Paper: Communication with evidence in the lab (2018)
Working Paper: Communication with evidence in the lab (2018)
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