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Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry

Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim (), Philip Neary and Jonathan Newton

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 110, issue C, 273-294

Abstract: When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents' non-best response behavior, we show that the Egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Without intentional bias, a new solution, the Logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm. These results contrast with results under non-payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai–Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms. We complement the theory with experiments on human subjects, results of which suggest that non-best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias. This suggests the Egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm.

Keywords: Evolution; Nash program; Logit choice; Egalitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Conventional Contracts, Intentional behavior and Logit Choice: Equality Without Symmetry (2016) Downloads
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