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Conventional Contracts, Intentional behavior and Logit Choice: Equality Without Symmetry

Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim (), Philip Neary and Jonathan Newton

No 2016-13, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents’ non-best response behavior, the Egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Without intentional bias, a new solution, the Logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm. These results contrast with results under non-payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms. Experiments on human subjects suggest that non-best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias. This suggests the Egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm.

Keywords: Evolution; Nash program; Logit choice; Egalitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-exp
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Journal Article: Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry (2018) Downloads
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