Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
Mu'alem, Ahuva and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 110, issue C, 174-193
This paper presents inapproximability results for paradigmatic multi-dimensional truthful mechanism design problems.
Keywords: Algorithmic Mechanism Design; Scheduling; Bayesian Incentive-Compatible mechanisms; Truthfulness-in-expectation mechanisms; Randomized truthful mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:174-193
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