Setting lower bounds on truthfulness

Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 110, issue C, 174-193

Abstract: This paper presents inapproximability results for paradigmatic multi-dimensional truthful mechanism design problems.

Keywords: Algorithmic Mechanism Design; Scheduling; Bayesian Incentive-Compatible mechanisms; Truthfulness-in-expectation mechanisms; Randomized truthful mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:174-193

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.001

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