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Bidding games and efficient allocations

Reshef Meir, Gil Kalai and Moshe Tennenholtz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 112, issue C, 166-193

Abstract: Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next (Lazarus et al., 1999). We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called bidding games, showing the existence of pure subgame-perfect equilibria (PSPE). In particular, we show that PSPEs form a semilattice, with a unique and natural Bottom Equilibrium.

Keywords: Extensive form games; Richman games; Combinatorial games; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:112:y:2018:i:c:p:166-193