Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation

Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 111, issue C, 187-202

Abstract: We consider house (re)allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We are concerned with the possibility that a pair of agents may gain by swapping their endowments before the operation of the chosen rule. A rule is called endowments-swapping-proof if it is immune to this kind of manipulation. Our main result is that the top trading cycles rule is the only rule that satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and endowments-swapping-proofness.

Keywords: Endowments-swapping-proofness; Top trading cycles; Strategy-proofness; Housing markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:111:y:2018:i:c:p:187-202

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.004

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