Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games
Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 110, issue C, 216-225
This note studies whether any set of finitely supported mixed strategies can be represented as the unique Nash equilibrium of a game. This note shows that if strategy spaces are metric spaces containing infinitely many points, then any set of finitely supported mixed strategies can be represented as the unique Nash equilibrium to a separable game. If the strategy spaces are additionally subsets of Euclidean space with infinitely many cluster points, then any set of finitely supported mixed strategies can be represented as the unique Nash equilibrium to a polynomial game.
Keywords: Continuous games; Separable games; Polynomial games; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:216-225
Access Statistics for this article
Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai
More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().