The conditions in the existence results for discontinuous games by Reny and by Simon and Zame are incomparable

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 111, issue C, 16-19

Abstract: A natural way to relate the existence theorems of Reny (1999) and Simon and Zame (1990) would be to show the following: Each game with an endogenous sharing rule satisfying the assumptions of Simon and Zame (1990) is such that the payoff correspondence has a measurable selection inducing a normal-form game whose mixed extension satisfies the assumptions in Reny (1999). We present a result showing that this is not so in general, even when the assumptions in Reny (1999) are weakened to those in Barelli and Meneghel (2013).

Keywords: Games with an endogenous sharing rule; Discontinuous games; Existence of equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:111:y:2018:i:c:p:16-19

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.008

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