The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets

Ratul Lahkar () and Frank Riedel

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 91, issue C, 268-282

Abstract: We define the logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets and establish its fundamental properties, namely, the existence of a logit equilibrium, its convergence to a Nash equilibrium as the perturbation factor becomes small, and existence, uniqueness and continuity of solution trajectories. We apply the dynamic to the analysis of potential games and negative semidefinite games. We show that in a restricted state space of probability measures with bounded density functions, solution trajectories of the logit dynamic converge to logit equilibria in these two classes of games.

Keywords: Logit dynamic; Potential games; Negative semidefinite games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:268-282

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.009

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