Strategic disclosure of feasible options

Geoffroy de Clippel and Kfir Eliaz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 91, issue C, 145-165

Abstract: The paper illustrates how people who need to make a joint decision may have an incentive to withhold information regarding the existence of Pareto improving options. The resulting level of inefficiency varies with the way compromises are reached when the parties have to choose among multiple options. Various reasonable compromise rules can be ranked unequivocally, and a rule resulting in a minimal level of inefficiency is identified. Qualitative results extend to sequential disclosure. Enforcing a hard deadline for disclosure may be welfare improving in some circumstances.

Keywords: Bargaining; Disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:145-165

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.016

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