Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

Christian Hilbe, Arne Traulsen and Karl Sigmund

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 92, issue C, 41-52

Abstract: Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not.

Keywords: Repeated games; Zero-determinant strategies; Cooperation; Reciprocity; Extortion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:92:y:2015:i:c:p:41-52

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005

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