Firing threats: Incentive effects and impression management

Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González and Stephen Rassenti
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Roberto Hernán González

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 91, issue C, 97-113

Abstract: We study the effect of firing threats in a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can fire up to one third of their workforce produce twice as much as organizations for which firing is not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure. Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats underperformed those using individual incentives. In the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression management activities to be seen as hard-working individuals in line with our model. Finally, production levels dropped substantially when the threat of being fired was removed, whereas on-the-job leisure surged.

Keywords: Firing threats; Incentives; Impression management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:97-113

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.015

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