Time and Nash implementation
Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 91, issue C, 229-236
In this paper, we study the full implementation problem using mechanisms that allow a delay. The delay on the equilibrium path may be zero, an infinitesimally small number or a fixed positive number. In all these three cases, implementable rules are fully characterized by a monotonicity condition. We provide examples to show that some delayed implementable social choice rules are not implementable in Nash-equilibrium refinements without a delay. As an application of our approach, we characterize delayed implementable rules in environments where only the discounting changes between states.
Keywords: Implementation; Delay; Time; Social choice rules; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 C72 D60 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:229-236
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