Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case

Josef Hofbauer, Jörg Oechssler and Frank Riedel

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 65, issue 2, 406-429

Abstract: Brown and von Neumann introduced a dynamical system that converges to saddle points of zero sum games with finitely many strategies. Nash used the mapping underlying these dynamics to prove existence of equilibria in general games. The resulting Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics are a benchmark example for myopic adjustment dynamics that, in contrast to replicator dynamics, allow for innovation, but require less rationality than the best response dynamics. This paper studies the BNN dynamics for games with infinitely many strategies. We establish Nash stationarity for continuous payoff functions. For negative semidefinite games (that include zero sum games), we generalize the results of Brown and von Neumann. In addition, we show that evolutionarily robust Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable. A complete stability analysis for doubly symmetric games is also obtained.

Keywords: Learning; in; games; Evolutionary; stability; BNN (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: the continuous strategy case (2005)
Working Paper: Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case (2005)
Working Paper: Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case (2005)
Working Paper: Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:406-429

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