On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

Marina Núñez () and Carles Rafels

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 1, 290-302

Abstract: The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position.

Keywords: Assignment; game; Core; Core; dimension (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: On the dimension of the core of the assignment game (2006)
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