Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games

Pedro Rey-Biel

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 65, issue 2, 572-585

Abstract: We report experimental results on a series of ten one-shot two-person 3x3 normal form games with unique equilibrium in pure strategies played by non-economists. In contrast to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, a majority of actions taken coincided with the equilibrium prediction (70.2%) and were best-responses to subjects' stated beliefs (67.2%). In constant-sum games, 78% of actions taken were predicted by the equilibrium model, outperforming simple K-level reasoning models. We discuss how non-trivial game characteristics related to risk aversion, efficiency concerns and social preferences may affect the predictive value of different models in simple normal form games.

Keywords: Experiments; Normal; form; games; Constant; sum; games; Stated; beliefs; K-level; reasoning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (67)

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Working Paper: Equilibrium Play and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Normal Form Games
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:572-585

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