A note on equivalence of consistency and bilateral consistency through converse consistency

Theo Driessen and Cheng-Cheng Hu

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 65, issue 2, 644-648

Abstract: In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable utility, the three notions of consistency, bilateral consistency, and converse consistency are frequently used to provide axiomatic characterizations of a particular solution (like the core, prekernel, prenucleolus, Shapley value). Our main equivalence theorem claims that a solution satisfies consistency (with respect to an arbitrary reduced game) if and only if the solution satisfies both bilateral consistency and converse consistency (with respect to the same reduced game). The equivalence theorem presumes transitivity of the reduced game technique as well as difference independence on payoff vectors for two-person reduced games.

Keywords: Coalitional; TU-game; Reduced; game; (Bilateral); Consistency; Converse; consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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