Strategic divide and choose
Antonio Nicolo' () and
Yan Yu ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 1, 268-289
We consider the classic cake-division problem when the cake is a heterogeneous good represented by an interval in the real line. We provide a mechanism to implement, in an anonymous way, an envy-free and efficient allocation when agents have private information on their preferences. The mechanism is a multi-step sequential game form in which each agent at each step receives a morsel of the cake that is the intersection of what she asks for herself and what the other agent concedes to her.
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Working Paper: Strategic Divide and Choose (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:268-289
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