Strategic Divide and Choose
Antonio Nicolo' () and
Yan Yu ()
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Antonio Nicolo': University of Padova
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Nicolo' ()
No 22, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"
We consider the classic cake-divison problem when the cake is a heterogeneous good represented by an interval in the real line. We provide a mechanism to implement, in an anonymous way, an envy-free and efficient allocation when agents have private information on their preferences. The mechanism is a multistep sequential game form in which each agent at each step receives a morsel of the cake that is the intersection of what she asks for herself and what the other agent concedes to her.
Pages: 24 pages
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Journal Article: Strategic divide and choose (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pad:wpaper:0022
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