Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 1, 237-267
In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocity.
Keywords: Emotions; Fairness; Path-dependency; Reciprocity; Social; norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:237-267
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