Aversion to norm-breaking: A model

Raúl López-Pérez

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 1, 237-267

Abstract: In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocity.

Keywords: Emotions; Fairness; Path-dependency; Reciprocity; Social; norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (70)

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