On the use of menus in sequential common agency

Giacomo Calzolari () and Alessandro Pavan

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 1, 329-334

Abstract: We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization.

Keywords: Sequential; contracting; Mechanism; design; Menus; theorems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:329-334

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