Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations

Maxwell Pak

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 2, 650-665

Abstract: This paper considers stochastic stability analysis in evolutionary models with time-dependent mutations. It takes a class of time-homogeneous Markov models where the transition probabilities are approximately polynomial functions of the mutation parameter and allows the mutation parameter to decline to zero over time. The main result shows that as long as the mutation parameter converges to zero slowly enough and its variation is finite, the resulting time-inhomogeneous model has a limiting distribution regardless of the details of the mutation process. Moreover, a bound on the required rate of decline is explicitly expressed as a function of the minimum coradius of the limit sets and the transition probabilities within the minimum coradius set.

Keywords: Evolution; Learning; Stochastic; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(08)00044-4
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:650-665

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().