Incentives in decentralized random matching markets

Joana Pais ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 2, 632-649

Abstract: Decentralized markets are modeled by means of a sequential game where, starting from any matching situation, firms are randomly given the opportunity to make job offers. In this random context, we prove the existence of ordinal subgame perfect equilibria where firms act according to a list of preferences. Moreover, every such equilibrium preserves stability for a particular profile of preferences. In particular, when firms best reply by acting truthfully, every equilibrium outcome is stable for the true preferences. Conversely, when the initial matching is the empty matching, every stable matching can be reached as the outcome of an ordinal equilibrium play of the game.

Keywords: Matching; markets; Stability; Random; mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives in Decentralized Random Matching Markets (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:632-649

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