First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution

Paulo Monteiro

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 65, issue 1, 256-269

Abstract: In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the independent private values, first-price auction for any distribution of valuations. The equilibrium strategy is a pure strategy at the continuity points of the distribution and bids a mixed strategy at the discontinuity points of the distribution.

Keywords: First-price; auction; Independent; private; values; Symmetric; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution (2006)
Working Paper: First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution (2004)
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