Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models

Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 65, issue 2, 503-515

Abstract: Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model--i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries--which has a Nash consistent representation. The latter means that there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions satisfying the minimal requirement of respecting first order stochastic dominance among lotteries. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed.

Keywords: Effectivity; function; Game; form; Nash; consistent; representation; Lottery; model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models (2005)
Working Paper: Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models (2005)
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