Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences

Lars Ehlers and Ton Storcken

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 64, issue 2, 533-547

Abstract: In one-dimensional environments with single-peaked preferences we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space is a one-dimensional continuum such a welfare function is determined by a collection of 2N strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corollary we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voter's preference is strictly quasi-concave.

Keywords: Arrovian; social; choice; One-dimensional; continuum; Single-peaked; preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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