Dynamic expert incentives in teams

Tsz-Ning Wong and Lily Ling Yang

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 125, issue C, 27-47

Abstract: We consider a model of dynamic expertise, in which two experts with the same bias exert efforts over time to discover the state of the world and are able to send verifiable messages about the discovery to a decision maker. We show that dynamic revelation of information causes the experts' incentives to acquire information to evolve over time. This leads to novel collaboration dynamics and, in particular, the introduction of another expert can have a “motivating” effect on the existing expert in spite of the incentive to free ride. We further set up the planner's problem and discuss when the (constrained) social optimum can be achieved.

Keywords: Information acquisition; Persuasion; Voluntary disclosure; Bayesian learning; Free-riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:125:y:2021:i:c:p:27-47

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.005

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