The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an n-player extensive form game

Kousha Etessami

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 125, issue C, 107-140

Abstract: We study the complexity of computing or approximating refinements of Nash equilibrium for finite n-player extensive form games of perfect recall (EFGPR), n≥3. Our results apply to a number of well-studied refinements, including sequential equilibrium, extensive-form perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium.

Keywords: Extensive form game; Perfect equilibrium; Quasi-perfect equilibrium; Algorithms; Computational complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:125:y:2021:i:c:p:107-140

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.006

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