On the value of repetition for communication games

Delong Meng

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 127, issue C, 227-246

Abstract: We study repeated communication between a long-run agent and a long-run principal. In each period the agent observes the state of the world – which is i.i.d. across time – and reports to the principal. The principal takes an action based on the history of the agent's reports and public randomization signals. We allow general state space, action space, and preferences. We characterize the set of possible payoffs for the principal and the agent as the discount factor goes to one. We also study the case when the discount factor is less than (but close to) one and analyze the rate of convergence to points on the frontier of the limit payoff set.

Keywords: Dynamic mechanisms; Repeated communication; Rate of convergence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:227-246

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.009

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