Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences

Ritesh Jain

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 127, issue C, 47-66

Abstract: A (deterministic) social choice correspondence F, mapping states into outcomes, is rationalizably implementable provided that there exists a mechanism such that the support of its set of rationalizable outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes recommended by F. We provide a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation, called r-monotonicity. This condition, when combined with some other auxiliary conditions, is also sufficient when there are at least three agents.

Keywords: Implementation; Social choice correspondences; r-Monotonicity; Rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:47-66

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.004

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