Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences
Ritesh Jain ()
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Ritesh Jain: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, http://www.econ.sinica.edu.tw/english/
No 19-A002, IEAS Working Paper : academic research from Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
A social choice correspondence (SCC) F is a mapping which associates with every state θ ∈ Θ a non empty subset of a set of outcomes. F is implementable in rationalizable strategies provided that there exists a mechanism such that for each state θ, the support of its set of rationalizable outcomes is equal to the socially desirable set F(θ). We find that r-monotonicity is a necessary condition for the rationalizable implementation of F. When there are at least three agents and F satisfies certain auxiliary conditions, r-monotonicity is also sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Finally, we show that a SCC which is never single valued is rationalizably implementable if and only if it satisfies r-monotonicity.
Keywords: : Implementation; Social choice correspondences; Monotonicity; Rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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