Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods

Guillaume Cheikbossian

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 127, issue C, 206-226

Abstract: We provide an evolutionary explanation for the well-established evidence of the existence of in-group favoritism in intergroup conflict. Using a model of group contest for a (local) public good, we show that the larger the number of groups competing against one another, or the larger the degree of complementarity between individual efforts, the more likely are group members altruistic towards their teammates under preference evolution.

Keywords: Indirect evolutionary approach; Evolutionary stability; Altruism; Group contest; Public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D64 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:206-226

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.003

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