Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods
Guillaume Cheikbossian
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Abstract:
We provide an evolutionary explanation for the well-established evidence of the existence of in-group favoritism in intergroup conflict. Using a model of group contest for a (local) public good, we show that the larger the number of groups competing against one another, or the larger the degree of complementarity between individual efforts, the more likely are group members altruistic towards their teammates under preference evolution.
Keywords: Indirect Evolutionary Approach; Evolutionary Stability; Altruism; Group Contest; Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03181458
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 127, pp.206-226. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.003⟩
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Journal Article: Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods (2021) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03181458
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.003
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