Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games

Péter Vida and Takakazu Honryo

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 127, issue C, 102-112

Abstract: The concept of unprejudiced beliefs equilibrium is simple: out-of-equilibrium beliefs should be consistent with the principle that multiple deviations are infinitely less likely than single deviations. Our questions are: does there always exist such an equilibrium and what can be done if there are multiple such equilibria?

Keywords: Multi-sender signaling; Unprejudiced beliefs; Strategic stability; Forward induction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:102-112

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.006

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