Attainment of equilibrium via Marshallian path adjustment: Queueing and buyer determinism

Sean M. Collins, Duncan James, Maroš Servátka and Radovan Vadovič

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 125, issue C, 94-106

Abstract: We examine equilibration in a market where Marshallian path adjustment can be enforced, or not, as a treatment: a posted offer market either with buyer queueing via value order, or random order, respectively. We derive equilibrium predictions, and run experiments crossing queueing rules with either human or deterministically optimizing robot buyers under both locally stationary and non-stationary marginal cost. Results on rate of convergence to competitive equilibrium are obtained, and Marshallian path adjustment is established as conducive to attaining competitive equilibrium.

Keywords: Posted offer; Advance production; Market entry game; Marshallian path adjustment; Equilibration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Attainment of Equilibrium via Marshallian Path Adjustment: Queueing and Buyer Determinism (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:125:y:2021:i:c:p:94-106

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.001

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