Attainment of Equilibrium via Marshallian Path Adjustment: Queueing and Buyer Determinism

Sean M. Collins, Duncan James, Maroš Servátka and Radovan Vadovič

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We examine equilibration in a market where Marshallian path adjustment can be enforced, or not, as a treatment: a posted offer market either with buyer queueing via value order, or random order, respectively. We derive equilibrium predictions, and run experiments crossing queueing rules with either human or deterministically optimizing robot buyers under both locally stationary and nonstationary marginal cost. Results on rate of convergence to competitive equilibrium are obtained, and Marshallian path adjustment is established as conducive to attaining competitive equilibrium.

Keywords: laboratory experiment; Marshallian path adjustment; equilibration; markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C4 C9 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-exp
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Journal Article: Attainment of equilibrium via Marshallian path adjustment: Queueing and buyer determinism (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:104444

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