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Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – evidence from a natural field experiment

Mark Kassis, Sascha L. Schmidt, Dominik Schreyer () and Matthias Sutter ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 126, issue C, 278-287

Abstract: In this paper, we show that the right to determine the sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament improves the chances of winning the contest. Because studying dynamic team tournaments – like R&D races – with interim feedback is difficult with company data, we examine decisions of highly paid professionals in soccer penalty shootouts and show that teams whose captains can decide about the shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout. So, managerial decisions matter for outcomes of dynamic tournaments and we discuss potential reasons for this finding.

Keywords: Dynamic tournament; Sports professionals; Psychological pressure; Value of decision rights; Penalty shoot-outs; Behavioral economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D00 D81 D91 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Related works:
Working Paper: Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – Evidence from a natural field experiment (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – Evidence from a natural field experiment (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Psychological Pressure and the Right to Determine the Moves in Dynamic Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – Evidence from a natural field experiment (2020) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:126:y:2021:i:c:p:278-287

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.006

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