Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences

Eric Bahel and Yves Sprumont ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 126, issue C, 94-99

Abstract: We describe the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for choosing sets of objects when preferences are additive and monotonic. Keywords: strategy-proofness; additive preferences; decomposability; participatory budgeting.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Monotonic additive preferences; Decomposability; Participatory budgeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:126:y:2021:i:c:p:94-99

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.001

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