The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity

Alexia Gaudeul, Claudia Keser and Stephan Müller

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 126, issue C, 251-277

Abstract: We theoretically and experimentally study the evolution of strategies reflecting different moral judgments under indirect reciprocity. We fully characterize the asymptotically stable sets of rest points. In all cooperative rest points multiple strategies coexist. This offers an explanation for the heterogeneity in moral judgments among humans. The behavior prescribed by the predicted strategies can rationalize the design of real-life reputation systems, which are set up to resolve problems of moral hazard. In our laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of participants play strategies that belong to the predicted set of strategies.

Keywords: Indirect reciprocity; Cooperation; Evolution; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Evolution of Morals under Indirect Reciprocity (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:126:y:2021:i:c:p:251-277

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.004

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