 The evolution of choice and learning in the two-person beauty contest game from kindergarten to adulthoodIsabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 120, issue C, 132-143 Abstract: We develop a graphical, non-analytical version of the two-person beauty contest game to study the developmental trajectory of instinctive behavior and learning from kindergarten to adulthood. These are captured by observing behavior when the game is played in two consecutive trials. We find that equilibrium behavior in the first trial increases significantly between 5 and 10 years of age (from 17.9% to 61.4%) and stabilizes afterwards. Children of all ages learn to play the equilibrium, especially when they observe an equilibrium choice by the rival. Our younger children are the weakest learners mainly because they are less frequently paired with rivals who play at equilibrium. Finally, the choice process data suggests that participants who play at equilibrium in the second trial are also performing fewer steps before reaching a decision, indicating that they are less hesitant about their strategy. Keywords: Developmental game theory; Laboratory experiment; Steps of dominance; Two-person beauty contest (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:132-143 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.009 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
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