 Recognition without replacement in legislative bargainingGames and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 161-175 Abstract: This paper studies infinite-horizon sequential bargaining among n≥3 players in which a proposer is randomly selected from the pool of potential proposers. If the proposal is rejected, the current and previous proposers are excluded from the pool of potential proposers, and the game moves on to the next round until every player has had the same number of opportunities to be the proposer. To analyze the model with a particular time dependency within each sequence of n rounds (a cycle), I characterize the stationary equilibrium of a stochastic game, which I call cycle-stationary subgame perfect (CSSP) equilibrium. The CSSP equilibrium is unique in payoffs and analogous to the subgame perfect equilibrium of some forms of finite-horizon bargaining. Even when every player is entirely patient, the proposer's share in the CSSP equilibrium is smaller than that predicted by the stationary equilibrium of the Baron–Ferejohn legislative bargaining model. Keywords: Legislative bargaining; Recognition process; Random sampling without replacement (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:161-175 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.007 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
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