Lying and reciprocity

Simon Dato, Eberhard Feess () and Petra Nieken

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 193-218

Abstract: We extend the literature on the determinants of lying to the impact of reciprocity in strategic interactions. We study a theoretical model with reciprocity by assuming that a player's degree of altruism depends on her perception of the other player's altruism towards herself. Specifically, we consider a sequential two-player-contest and vary the second mover's degree of information on the first movers lying behavior. This yields predictions on the second mover's behavior which we study in a largescale online-experiment and the laboratory. Surprisingly, the second mover's lying propensity does not depend on her information on the first mover's lying behavior. To investigate whether this is specific to lying, we consider an additional treatment with the same payoff structure where subjects can increase their chances of winning by simple statements without lying. As we do find evidence for reciprocity there, the lack of reciprocity cannot solely be attributed to the contest structure.

Keywords: Private information; Lying; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D82 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Lying and Reciprocity (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:193-218

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.014

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