Essentially stable matchings

Peter Troyan, David Delacretaz and Andrew Kloosterman

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 120, issue C, 370-390

Abstract: We propose a solution to the conflict between fairness and efficiency in one-sided matching markets. A matching is essentially stable if any priority-based claim initiates a chain of reassignments that results in the initial claimant losing the object. We show that an essentially stable and Pareto efficient matching always exists and that Kesten's (2010) EADA mechanism always selects one while other common Pareto efficient mechanisms do not. Additionally, we show that there exists a student-pessimal essentially stable matching and that the Rural Hospital Theorem extends to essential stability. Finally, we analyze the incentive properties of essentially stable mechanisms.

Keywords: Matching; Stability; Fairness; Efficiency; School choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D61 D63 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:370-390

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.009

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