A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem

Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 486-490

Abstract: We characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance.

Keywords: Queueing problem; Symmetrically balanced VCG rule; Axiomatic characterization; Simple proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:486-490

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.001

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