A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
Manipushpak Mitra () and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 486-490
We characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance.
Keywords: Queueing problem; Symmetrically balanced VCG rule; Axiomatic characterization; Simple proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:486-490
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